Mission Command

Teaching Officers How to Think verses Telling Them What To Think

Educating future leaders and officers in “how to think” (cognitive skills) takes longer and is intellectually far more expensive than industrially based task training, while task training requires resources like weapons, ranges, equipment, and special facilities that require training be done at established locations, requiring centralization. The good news is that recent studies by Dr. Bjork (UCLA) have discovered that theories about learning have been wrong.

Podcast on The Command Culture Necessary to Reshape the Golden Hour of Crisis

Sand Table

George Whitney each week speaks with people making a difference in emergency management. They talk about what works, what doesn’t, how to work efficiently and how to get it done with maximum effect.

Harvard ROTC Leadership Conference

Myself and Will Foley a United States Army (Ret) Special Forces supervisor, instructor and operator, will be in Boston this weekend facilitating an Adaptive Leadership workshop for the Harvard ROTC Leadership Conference that includes Massachuaetts Institute of Technology, Boston University, North Eastern and Siena College.

We will be spending the two days facilitating tactical decision games and red team exercises for about 80 People about to be commissioned as officers in the United States military.

More to follow on the lessons learned from the next two days.

IN COMMAND AND OUT OF CONTROL

CATO Cover Spring 2014

This article is published in the current Spring 2014 CATO news, the official publication of the California Association of Tactical Officers. It was both an honor and privilege to have it published in this professional journal. Republished here with permission.

Crisis Meta-Leadership Lessons From the Boston Marathon Bombings Response: The Ingenuity of Swarm Intelligence

“Never tell your people how to do things. Tell them what to do, and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.” ~ General George Patton

Outstanding piece! The Myth of Mission Command by Don Vandergriff

U.S. and NATO doctrine manuals are too thick and redundant. I recommended to the Army CSA General Casey in 2008 in an office call that they should be pocket book, handbook size around 30 pages, in big font, double spaced pages and mainly using short historical vignettes—good and bad—for examples. They should consist of principles. Under Mission Command let our people figure it out how to accomplish the principles based on a never ending evolution of Lessons Learned and experience. Inter mix them with good and bad historical lessons.

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